Recent work on the mechanisms underlying children's developing theories of
mind have identified information-processing capacity as a factor that contr
ibutes to children's developing understanding of false belief (Davis & Prat
t, 1995). One hundred children 3 to 5 years of age were given a set of fals
e belief tasks and a measure of working memory. A major goal of the study w
as to replicate the findings of Davis and Pratt using a wider set of false
belief tasks and a different measure of working memory. The present study t
ested the hypothesis that working memory would predict children's performan
ce on the false belief tasks. A hierarchical regression analysis showed tha
t, when the effects of age were controlled for, working memory accounted fo
r 7.4% of the variance in children's false belief scores. The findings supp
ort those of Davis and Prate, and extend them through the use of another me
asure of working memory. It is concluded that, while the findings indicate
a role for working memory in the development of false belief understanding,
it is the case that working memory is only one of a number of factors that
underlie the development of children's theories of mind.