When distinctiveness fails, false memories prevail

The argument advanced in this article is that false memories can arise beca use of processes that normally affect forgetting, namely, the decline of di stinctiveness and the rise of retroactive interference. Specifically, when the distinctiveness of a trace relative to the background of other traces d iminishes, the potential for interference among like traces increases. To t he extent that memories lose their distinctive properties, including the so urce of the memory, such memories may become confused with events that are supposed to be recalled as actually having occurred. This idea is elaborate d in the context of studies of the effects of distinctiveness on reducing r etroactive interference in children's long-term retention. It is concluded that advances in understanding false memories and the role distinctiveness might play in reducing such misrememberings is contingent on the developmen t of additional formal modeling approaches like the one presented in the le ad paper by Brainerd and Reyna (1998, this issue), (C) 1998 Academic Press.