BAYESIANISM AND DIVERSE EVIDENCE - A REPLY TO WAYNE,ANDREW

Andrew Wayne (1995) discusses some recent attempts to account, within a Bayesian framework, for the ''common methodological adage'' that ''d iverse evidence better confirms a hypothesis than does the same amount of similar evidence'' (112). One of the approaches considered by Wayn e is that suggested by Howson and Urbach (1989/1993) and dubbed the '' correlation approach'' by Wayne. This approach is, indeed, incomplete, in that it neglects the role of the hypothesis under consideration in determining what diversity in a body of evidence is relevant diversit y. In this paper, it is shown how this gap can be filled, resulting in a more satisfactory account of the evidential role of diversity of ev idence. In addition, it is argued that Wayne's criticism of the correl ation approach does not indicate a serious flaw in the approach.