Through a detailed study of informal credit transactions in a village in no
rthern Bangladesh, the research empirically establishes that increased acce
ss to credit from micro-finance institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh has been
unable to substitute for the higher-cost informal credit sources. The reaso
n for this is that MFI lending technology is insensitive to variations in h
ousehold conditions. Most MFIs put all households on a treadmill of continu
ously increasing loan size and insist on a fixed repayment schedule. While
an easily accessible loan may seem attractive to a cash-starved poor househ
old, its resource profile and the wider economic and policy environment imp
ose limits on the marginal, return to capital. Credit escalation under thes
e circumstances increases the likelihood of cross-financing to sustain the
MFI's line of credit. Target-group households, in particular, resort to ext
ensive cross-financing of their loans. II is argued that cross-financing ca
n have a deleterious effect on the household economy in the long-run if hou
seholds continuously manage loan repayment without having the ability to re
pay. II is suggested that MFI lending technology be redesigned to be sensit
ive to household initial conditions. Only then can MFIs seriously compete w
ith the informal lenders.