Organizational learning takes place through activities performed by individ
uals, groups, and organizations as they gather and digest information, imag
ine and plan new actions, and implement change. I examine the learning prac
tices of companies in two industries - nuclear power plants and chemical pr
ocess plants - that must manage safety as a major component of operations,
and therefore must learn from precursors and near-misses rather than exclus
ively by trial-and-error. Specifically, I analyse the linked assumptions or
logics underlying incident reviews, root cause analysis teams, and self-an
alysis programmes. These loses arise from occupational and hierarchical gro
ups that work on different problems in different ways - for example, antici
pation and resilience, fixing and learning, concrete and abstract. In organ
izations with fragmentary, myopic and disparate understandings of how the w
ork is accomplished, there ape likely to be more failures to learn from ope
rating experience, recurrent problems, and cyclical crises. Enhanced learni
ng requires ways to broaden and bring together disparate logics.