This paper analyzes harvesting and timber bequest behavior in a two-period
overlapping generations model where the government uses site productivity,
yield and inheritance taxation. The ceteris paribus effects of forest and i
nheritance taxes are derived first, then the paper discusses the optimal de
sign of forest and inheritance taxes by assuming that intergenerational ext
ernalities are either absent or operative. In the absence of intergeneratio
nal externalities, it is optimal to use only the site productivity tax, and
not to introduce yield and inheritance taxes at all. In the presence of in
tergenerational externalities the situation changes. The paper demonstrates
that the externality can be internalized by introducing either a yield tax
or an inheritance subsidy, or both. If the government is able to use both
at the same time, it is desirable to use the yield tax to 'punish' excessiv
e harvesting and an inheritance subsidy to 'bribe' to give bequests.