NOT FOR SECURITY ONLY - THE DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND DEFENSE EXPENDITURE - AN INTRODUCTION

The analysis of military expenditure, inside alliances as well as outs ide, has gained much when the original Olson-Zeckhauser approach was g eneralized into the joint-product model of alliances as developed by T odd Sandler and others. This model allowed, as benefits to allies dete rmining military expenditure, not only deterrence, a pure collective g ood, but partially collective goods like conventional fighting power a nd private (country-specific) benefits. The papers in this Special Iss ue explore the explanatory potential of also considering the demand fo r positional goods, in particular great-power status, as a determinant of military expenditure. The ''exploitation of the strong by the weak '' characterizing NATO until the early 1970s and during the American d efence buildup of 1980-1985 might also be explained by an informal lea der-follower bargain between the United States and its allies who trad ed acceptance of American hegemony for military protection and ''hegem onic stability'' of the world economy.