The technique of latent fingerprint identification enjoys a remarkable degr
ee of credibility, even in the adversarial climate of the Anglo-American cr
iminal trial. Latent fingerprint examiners (LFPEs) are treated with a high
degree of deference in court proceedings. I trace this to the historical pr
ocess by which latent fingerprint examiners constructed rules of method and
practice which allowed them to present fingerprint identifications as matt
ers of fact. First, LFPEs maintained professional jurisdiction over the int
erpretation of fingerprint evidence, even while suggesting that the evidenc
e was 'speaking for itself'. Second, LFPEs devised rules of method and prac
tice which encouraged unanimity and consistency within the profession. Fina
lly, LFPEs managed cases of error by attributing failure to individual prac
titioners rather than to the method. I conclude that LFPEs offer a highly i
diosyncratic model of scientific evidence, one which new forensic identific
ation techniques, such as DNA typing, will be able to emulate only with dif
ficulty.