Although the research on values is thriving in the social sciences, the res
earch is confined by some lasting problems. In this paper we argue that the
se problems are partly embedded in the definition of values and in the comm
only used value-model. The idea that all values are concepts about the desi
rable shared by everybody is unsustainable. Some values are not unanimously
shared, and what often seems to be a universal value takes on very differe
nt meanings to different groups of people. It is also argued that the struc
ture of value conflicts may shift as a result of political struggle. The ty
pical causal-chain value model relies on strict theoretical distinction bet
ween exogenous, intermediate and dependent variables. We argue that distinc
tion between values and attitudes and between values and behavioural predis
positions tend to get blurred by the introduction of concepts like apolitic
al values,, and other concepts describing domain specific values in the mod
el. Moreover, the unique capacity of value-theory to explain how politicall
y unaware and uninterested citizens are capable of forming political prefer
ences, is lost. More generally, the determinism of both psychological theor
ies and functionalist models of value formation are criticised. Finally, it
is argued that the value-theory is less well developed when it comes to ex
plaining electoral behaviour.