Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable give
n the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states
. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the natio
nal level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policie
s. This article discusses a decision-making model where interest groups opt
imize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments
and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propos
itions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Con
trary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re-e
lection are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups t
arget their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the r
elevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of
the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as i
nfluential. Inter-municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbyin
g activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in
the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the st
rength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively
. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. T
he demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.