Behavioural determinants of public sector illegal strikes - Cases from Canada and the US

This article develops a framework for analyzing illegal public sector strik es that explains observed patterns of behaviour of employees, unions, manag ers, and third parties. If is found that no-strike laws diminish such posit ive effects of right-to-strike bargaining systems as eliciting information, adjusting expectations and providing catharsis. A new theoretical outline helps understand and explain such illegal strike characteristics as the sud denness of strike development, the rank-and-file nature, lack of union cont rol, conflict without clearly defined union objectives, and breakdown of th e conflict regulation process by neutral agencies. Three policy issues emer ge: some conflict could have been avoided with a broader scope of bargainin g (PATCO and Ontario jail guards); mandatory and more responsive third part y procedures should be legislatively provided. and such information about w orker discontent as grievance usage should be made available to dispute set tlement agencies and mediators before conflict escalates out of control.