Baumol and Gates' propositions, the irrelevancy of benefit uncertainty and
the importance of cost uncertainty on the choice between a tax and a system
of marketable permits, are limited to a large-number case in which the opp
ortunities for victims of pollution to participate in a permit market are n
on-existent. However, with the evolution of environmental groups and coalit
ions of victims in neighborhoods, the large-number case can easily transfor
m into a small-number case. This paper shows that when the pollution standa
rd, set at what appears to be optimal ex ante, is excessively lenient, the
system of marketable permits offers such groups a flexibility to buy pollut
ion permits in a competitive market and destroy them until the optimal solu
tion is realized. In the reverse situation, however, Baumol and Gates propo
sitions are unambiguously valid.