The author deals with four important attempts to focus on the Philosophy of
B. Bolzano in the context of problems of "Austrian Philosophy". The most i
mportant of these attempts in this context is represented by R. Haller's co
nception of "Austrian Philosophy". The essential aspects of "Austrian Philo
sophy" are embodied in realism, empiricism, and an antispeculative orientat
ion. All of these can be found in B. Bolzano's philosophy, inasmuch as this
philosophy is antithetical to the speculative nature and subjectivism of c
lassical German philosophy.
In P. Kampits' and W. M. Johnston's conceptions, Bolzano is situated in the
context of "Austrian Philosophy", especially because of its Leibnizianism,
and hence - in addition - some members of Brentano's school (Meninong, Hus
serl) were influenced by Bolzano's philosophical-logical theory of ideas, s
tatements and truths in themselves.
The last interpretation focussed on is represented by J. Pavlik's conceptio
n. This author puts stress on the contradiction between the subjectivistic
transcendentalism of the classical German philosophy on the one side, and t
he objectivist realism of B. Bolzano on the other. In addition, Pavlik dedu
ces ideological and political consequences which are too strong from this a
ntithesis; he contraposes German thinking, tending to totalitarianism to an
Austrian one, marked by a pluralistic nature. In his evalution of these co
nceptions, the author casts doubt on some of the interpretations, especiall
y on Haller's negative identification of idealism and speculation with conc
eptions of the classical German philosophy, or on deducing ideological and
political consequences from intrinsic philosophical premises, approached il
l a too simplistic manner. The author points out, that many difficulties ar
ise in connection with the attempt to assess a specifically "Austrian Philo
sophy", in general, too.