In a deregulated electricity market such as the California WEPEX, spinning
reserves must be explicitly identified as an ancillary service and priced.
Additionally, scheduling coordinators who match suppliers and demands may e
ither self-provide spinning reserves, or rely on the Independent System Ope
rator (ISO) to provide reserves at the spot price. The deregulated market s
tructure makes explicit the implicit softness that has always been recogniz
ed in the reserve constraints. additional reserves may have value even when
a minimum reserve requirement has been met. In this paper we formulate the
spinning reserve requirement (SRR) as a function of the endogenously deter
mined marginal values of reserves. The spinning reserve requirement depends
, according to a non-increasing response function, on a price/value signal.
We present three power system scheduling algorithms in which this price/va
lue signal is updated at each iteration of a dual optimization. Game theory
is used to interpret the proposed algorithms. Numerical test results are a
lso presented. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.