The EC's recognition of new states in former Yugoslavia is considered by mo
st analysts to have seriously aggravated the conflict in the region. This a
rticle challenges the conventional wisdom and argues that the strategic eff
ects of recognition have been largely overstated. The prospect of recogniti
on played no significant role in the Slovene determination to sustain their
campaign for independence and therefore bears little responsibility for th
e first phase of the war. In Croatia, recognition - together with the deplo
yment of UN peacekeepers - may even have had a mitigating effect. Only in B
osnia is there any correlation between recognition and an intensification o
f hostilities but it is doubtful whether non-recognition would have prevent
ed the eruption of violence since Bosnian Serb aspirations for an ethnicall
y homogeneous state entity could not be realised without resort to war. The
real relevance of recognition lies with the opportunities for more effecti
ve international action which it created. It was the failure to seize these
opportunities, rather than the strategic effects of recognition, which bet
ter explains the tragic events that ensued.