Where is the common knowledge? Empirical support for requiring expert testimony in sexual harassment trials

The use of expert testimony in sexual harassment trials is a contentious is sue in the federal courts. Federal court judges frequently disallow expert testimony because they assume that what constitutes sexual harassment is "c ommon knowledge" and therefore expert opinion on the matter would not be he lpful to the trier of fact. Donna Shestowsky argues that empirical evidence finding that men and women have vastly different perceptions of sexual har assment indicates that a common knowledge base for determining reasonable b ehavior does not exist. She argues that expert testimony is so useful for c orrecting the substantial misconceptions and biases of the jurors and judge s who decide sexual harassment cases that this testimony should be regarded as necessary for the just adjudication of sexual harassment claims. This n ote describes three common topics of expert testimony in sexual harassment cases-sexual stereotyping, reasonableness, and reluctant reporting. Cases i n which expert testimony was admitted are contrasted with those in which it was excluded, and experimental and survey research pertaining to each test imony topic is used to evaluate the utility of expert testimony from empiri cal and policy perspectives. The note concludes with guidelines for policy and future research.