Veto games: Spatial committees under unanimity rule

There exists a large literature on two-person bargaining games and distribu tion games (or divide-the-dollar games) under simple majority rule, where i n equilibrium a minimal winning coalition takes full advantage over everyon e else. Here we extend the study to an n-person veto game where players tak e turns proposing policies in an n-dimensional policy space and everybody h as a veto over changes in the status quo. Briefly, we find a Nash equilibri um where the initial proposer offers a policy in the intersection of the Pa reto optimal set and the Pareto superior set that gives everyone their cont inuation values, and punishments are never implemented. Comparing the equil ibrium outcomes under two different agendas sequential recognition and rand om recognition - we find that there are advantages generated by the order o f proposal under the sequential recognition rule. We also provide some cond itions under which the players will prefer to rotate proposals rather than allow any specific policy to prevail indefinitely.