Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis

In recent years evolutionary psychologists have developed and defended the Massive Modularity Hypothesis, which maintains that our cognitive architect ure-including the part that subserves 'central processing'-is largely or pe rhaps even entirely composed of innate, domain-specific computational mecha nisms or 'modules'. In this paper I argue for two claims. First, I show tha t the two main arguments that evolutionary psychologists have offered for t his general architectural thesis fail to provide us with any reason to pref er it to a competing picture of the mind which I call the Library Model of Cognition. Second, I argue that this alternative model is compatible with t he central theoretical and methodological commitments of evolutionary psych ology. Thus I argue that, at present, the endorsement of the Massive Modula rity Hypothesis by evolutionary psychologists is both unwarranted and unmot ivated.