Foreclosed impartiality in capital sentencing: Jurors' predispositions, guilt-trial experience, and premature decision making

Citation
Wj. Bowers et al., Foreclosed impartiality in capital sentencing: Jurors' predispositions, guilt-trial experience, and premature decision making, CORNELL L R, 83(6), 1998, pp. 1476-1556
Citations number
43
Categorie Soggetti
Law
Journal title
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ISSN journal
00108847 → ACNP
Volume
83
Issue
6
Year of publication
1998
Pages
1476 - 1556
Database
ISI
SICI code
0010-8847(199809)83:6<1476:FIICSJ>2.0.ZU;2-3
Abstract
The bifurcation of the capital trial into separate guilt. and sentencing ph ases is the most decisive and uniform change in the administration of the d eath penalty under the capital statutes approved in Gregg v. Georgia(1) and companion cases. By law, jurors make the life or death sentencing decision at a separate penalty trial after the determination of guilt in accordance with carefully drawn sentencing instructions. These sentencing instruction s are intended to guide the exercise of sentencing discretion by articulati ng those aggravating and mitigating considerations that are relevant to thi s decision. In this way, the exercise of capital sentencing discretion is t o be guided and thus freed of constitutionally impermissible caprice, arbit rariness, and discrimination. The Supreme Court has underscored the importa nce of a separate and independent sentencing decision in Morgan v. Illinois ,(2) requiring that capital jurors give effect to the statutory considerati ons that are appropriate for the sentencing decision.(3)