A new class of matching problems that models centralized college admissions
via standardized tests is presented. The allocation mechanism that is used
in real-life applications of this problem in Turkey is analyzed. It is sho
wn that this mechanism, multi-category serial dictatorship, has a number of
serious deficiencies, most notably inefficiency, vulnerability to manipula
tion, and the potential of penalizing students for improved test scores. Ex
ploiting the relation between this class of problems and the celebrated col
lege admissions model (Gale & Shapley [4]), an alternative mechanism is pro
posed that overcomes these deficiencies. This mechanism-the Gale-Shapley st
udent optimal mechanism-is characterized as "best" in this context. Journal
of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78. (C) 199
9 Academic Press.