An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions

Authors
Peris, JE Sanchez, MC
Citation
Je. Peris et Mc. Sanchez, An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions, ECON LETT, 62(2), 1999, pp. 201-206
Citations number
6
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ECONOMICS LETTERS
ISSN journal
01651765 → ACNP
Volume
62
Issue
2
Year of publication
1999
Pages
201 - 206
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-1765(199902)62:2<201:AOTIFA>2.0.ZU;2-#
Abstract
We prove the existence of oligarchies and individuals with different degree s of veto power in the context of fixed agenda social choice correspondence s by dropping Pareto Optimality assumptions and by imposing only Weak Indep endence. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.