Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

Authors
Barbera, S Masso, J Neme, A
Citation
S. Barbera et al., Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes, SOC CHOICE, 16(2), 1999, pp. 321-336
Citations number
10
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
ISSN journal
01761714 → ACNP
Volume
16
Issue
2
Year of publication
1999
Pages
321 - 336
Database
ISI
SICI code
0176-1714(199902)16:2<321:MDOPPS>2.0.ZU;2-U
Abstract
We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized med ian voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualif ied version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of powe r among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.