Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule under the dual culture condition

Authors
Citation
Wv. Gehrlein, Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule under the dual culture condition, SOC SCI RES, 28(1), 1999, pp. 36-44
Citations number
10
Categorie Soggetti
Sociology & Antropology
Journal title
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
ISSN journal
0049089X → ACNP
Volume
28
Issue
1
Year of publication
1999
Pages
36 - 44
Database
ISI
SICI code
0049-089X(199903)28:1<36:CEOBRU>2.0.ZU;2-V
Abstract
The Condorcet winner in an election is a candidate who could defeat each of the other available alternatives by majority rule in a series of pairwise voter, The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional pr obability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet w inner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule, w hich assigns weights of(1, 1/2, 0) respectively to each voter's first. seco nd, and third ranked candidates. and elects the candidate with the most tot al points. A closed form representation is obtained for the Condorset effic iency of Borda Rule with large electorates under the dual culture condition for three-candidate elections. Borda Rule is shown to perform very well ov er the range of dual culture probability vectors. (C) 1999 Academic Press.