The Condorcet winner in an election is a candidate who could defeat each of
the other available alternatives by majority rule in a series of pairwise
voter, The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional pr
obability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet w
inner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule, w
hich assigns weights of(1, 1/2, 0) respectively to each voter's first. seco
nd, and third ranked candidates. and elects the candidate with the most tot
al points. A closed form representation is obtained for the Condorset effic
iency of Borda Rule with large electorates under the dual culture condition
for three-candidate elections. Borda Rule is shown to perform very well ov
er the range of dual culture probability vectors. (C) 1999 Academic Press.