Neoliberal economic reforms, rather than unleashing market forces, can resu
lt in new institutions for market governance. By vacating institutionalized
policy domains, neoliberal reforms can trigger two-step reregulation proce
sses, as first, political entrepreneurs launch projects to build support co
alitions by reregulating markets, and second, societal groups respond to th
ese projects by mobilizing to influence the terms of reregulation. Dependin
g on the strengths and strategies politicians and societal groups, reregula
tion processes result in varied institutions for market governance. The art
icle develops this argument by analyzing how neoliberal reforms in Mexico l
ed to the construction of distinct institutions for market governance acros
s four states (Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Puebla). The findings from Me
xico highlight the importance of moving beyond the questions of why develop
ing countries choose neoliberal policies and how they implement them. Stude
nts of the political economy of development should shift their attention in
stead to understanding the kinds of new institutions that replace those des
troyed or displaced by neoliberal reforms.