On and off the liability bandwagon: Explaining state adoptions of strict liability in hazardous waste programs

Citation
A. Alberini et D. Austin, On and off the liability bandwagon: Explaining state adoptions of strict liability in hazardous waste programs, J REGUL EC, 15(1), 1999, pp. 41-63
Citations number
24
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS
ISSN journal
0922680X → ACNP
Volume
15
Issue
1
Year of publication
1999
Pages
41 - 63
Database
ISI
SICI code
0922-680X(199901)15:1<41:OAOTLB>2.0.ZU;2-O
Abstract
We test a model of states' adoption of the hazardous waste liability regime (negligence, strict liability) providing greater net benefits. The likelih ood of adopting strict liability increases in a state's number of chemical- intensive manufacturing plants, decreases in the number of large mining est ablishments. Also predictive: severity of state's hazardous waste problem, effectiveness of other state environmental programs, and political climate. States may view strict liability as better for industrial than mining poll ution, and may be partly motivated by "precaution targeting" and "deep pock ets" mentality. Non-adopters may wish not to discourage business or have ot her programs that substitute for strict liability.