Breard, our dualist constitution, and the internationalist conception

In its decision last Term in Breard v. Greene, the Supreme Court refused to stay the execution of Angel Breard, an inmate in Virginia, even though Vir ginia had violated a treaty on consular relations and the International Cou rt of Justice had ordered the United States to "take all measures at its di sposal" to stay the execution. The international law academy has been heavi ly critical of the Supreme Court's decision and other aspects of the United States' handling of the Breard case. In this article, Professor Curtis Bra dley argues that the criticisms by the academy reflect an "internationalist conception" of the relationship between international law and U.S. domesti c law. This conception presumes that international law must be incorporated into domestic law, that international law should supersede domestic law wh en the two conflict, and that "foreign affairs exceptionalism" should provi de the federal government with expansive ability to enter into and implemen t international obligations. Using Breard as a case study, Professor Bradle y argues that the internationalist conception is inconsistent with this cou ntry's traditionally "dualist" approach to international law and that it is unlikely to be accepted by U.S. government actors.