Recall in extensive form games

Authors
Citation
K. Ritzberger, Recall in extensive form games, INT J GAME, 28(1), 1999, pp. 69-87
Citations number
13
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
ISSN journal
00207276 → ACNP
Volume
28
Issue
1
Year of publication
1999
Pages
69 - 87
Database
ISI
SICI code
0020-7276(1999)28:1<69:RIEFG>2.0.ZU;2-S
Abstract
This paper considers characterizations of perfect recall in extensive form games. It is shown that perfect recall can be expressed in terms of choices without any reference to infomation sets. When information sets are taken into account, it is decomposable into an ordering of information sets and t hat players do not forget what they knew nor what they did. Thus, if inform ation sets are partially ordered, then perfect recall is implied by the pla yer's inability to refine her information from the memory.