This article examines three conditions for cutting public expenditures
across a sample of 16 advanced industrial democracies: intent, abilit
y, and need during the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike spending increases, cut
s require purposeful action. action. A first condition, therefore, for
cutting expenditures is that leaders intend to curb spending. Surpris
ingly the results indicate that leftist parties are considerably more
effective at cutting expenditures than parties of the light. Indeed, l
eaders appear to have most latitude when a feared course of action is
considered least likely. A second condition is that of ability. instit
utions constrain and facilitate leadership. The degree to which decisi
on making must be shared within the executive both helps and hinders b
udget-cutting across exogenous conditions. While oversized coalitions
may impede losses, they may also facilitate them by sharing responsibi
lity for unpopular measures and thus reducing electoral repercussions.
Indeed, both party and institutional results point to the centrality
of avoiding blame in the loss-inducing process. A third condition for
cutting public expenditures involves need. While objective economic in
dicators are not irrelevant, the issue of need is largely politically
defined.