FROM COVARIATION TO CAUSATION - A CAUSAL POWER THEORY

Because causal relations are neither observable nor deducible, they mu st be induced from observable events. The 2 dominant approaches to the psychology of causal induction-the covariation approach and the causa l power approach-are each crippled by fundamental problems. This artic le proposes an integration of these approaches that overcomes these pr oblems. The proposal is that reasoners innately treat the relation bet ween covariation (a function defined in terms of observable events) an d causal power(an unobservable entity) as that between scientists' law or model and their theory explaining the model. This solution is form alized in the power PC theory, a causal power theory of the probabilis tic contrast model(P. W. Cheng & L. R. Novick, 1990). The article revi ews diverse old and new empirical tests discriminating this theory fro m previous models, none of which is justified by a theory. The results uniquely support the power PC theory.