A political economic analysis of Congressional voting patterns on NAFTA

This paper delves into the question of the determinants of Congressional vo ting on NAFTA. It uses a legit model to examine both House and Senate votes and is able to use district specific estimates in the former. It finds onl y very limited support for the thesis that narrowly defined employment gain ers and losers were important determinants of Congressional voting patterns , though some substantial support that districts that were highly agricultu ral or already possessed a substantial Hispanic population and skilled labo r force and had the most to gain from the general effects of NAFTA lead to a positive effect on the probability that a member of the House would vote affirmatively. Contributions from labor unions lowered the likelihood of af firmative votes. Political partisanship and ideological positions apparentl y had Little effect on the votes. A Representative's political capital had a marginally significant effect on the probability of an affirmative vote, but it performed positively in the Senate and negatively in the House.