A myth has arisen concerning Turing's article of 1936, namely that Tur
ing set forth a fundamental principle concerning the limits of what ca
n be computed by machine-a myth that has passed into cognitive science
and the philosophy of minds to wide and pernicious effect. This suppo
sed principle, sometimes incorrectly termed the Church-Turing thesis,
is the claim that the class of functions that can be computed by machi
nes is identical to the class of functions that can be computed by Tur
ing machines. In point of fact, Turing himself nowhere endorses or eve
n states this claim (nor does Church). The author describes a number o
f notional machines, both analog and digital, that can compute more th
an a universal Turing machine. These machines are exemplars of the cla
ss of nonclassical computing machines. Nothing known at present rules
out the possibility that machines in this class will one day be built
or that the brain itself is such a machine. These theoretical consider
ations undercut a number of foundational arguments that are commonly r
ehearsed in cognitive science and gesture toward a new class of cognit
ive models.