The 1996 welfare-reform law has been characterized as a significant act of
devolution. For some, this devolution will free states to become "laborator
ies of democracy" that develop better welfare policies; for others, it will
provoke a debilitating "race to the bottom" where states will reduce benef
its out of fear of becoming "welfare magnets" that attract recipients from
other states. This article suggests that neither "laboratories of democracy
" nor "race to the bottom" does justice to the complexities of the 1996 ref
orms. In the case of the former new federal mandates limit state action and
states face informal pressures to "keep up" with one another in developing
new restrictions so that they can avoid becoming "welfare magnets. "In the
case of the latter, we find limited empirical support for the existence of
welfare migration that is supposed to be provoking a "race to the bottom."
We find that there is limited welfare migration because the real value of
welfare benefits to recipients does not vary nearly as much cu common portr
ayals suggest. Given these realities, welfare reform may produce a procedur
al race to the bottom that turns the myth of migration into a self-fulfilli
ng prophesy.