Strength of evidence, judged probability, and choice under uncertainty

Authors
Citation
Cr. Fox, Strength of evidence, judged probability, and choice under uncertainty, COG PSYCHOL, 38(1), 1999, pp. 167-189
Citations number
26
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology
Journal title
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
ISSN journal
00100285 → ACNP
Volume
38
Issue
1
Year of publication
1999
Pages
167 - 189
Database
ISI
SICI code
0010-0285(199902)38:1<167:SOEJPA>2.0.ZU;2-Q
Abstract
This paper traces, within subjects, the relationship between assessed stren gth of evidence, judgments of probability, and decisions under uncertainty. The investigation relies on the theoretical framework provided by support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997), a nonexten sional model of judgment under uncertainty. Fans of professional basketball (N = 50) judged the probability that each of eight teams, four divisions, and two conferences would win the National Basketball Association champions hip. Additionally, participants rated the relative strength of each team, j udged the probability that a given team would win the championship assuming a particular pairing in the finals, priced prospects contingent on the win ner of the championship, and made choices between chance prospects. The dat a conformed to the major tenets of support theory, and the predicted relati onships between assessed strength of evidence, hypothetical support, judged probabilities, and choices under uncertainty also held quite well. (C) 199 9 Academic Press.