Normal forms of fuzzy middle and fuzzy contradictions

The expressions of "excluded middle" and "crisp contradiction'' are reexami ned starting with their original linguistic expressions which are first res tated in propositional and then predicate forms. It is shown that, in order to generalize the truth tables and hence the normal forms, the membership assignments in predicate expressions must be separated from their truth qua lification. In two-valued logic, there is no need to separate them from eac h other due to reductionist Aristotalean dichotomy. Whereas, in infinite (f uzzy) valued set and logic, the separation of membership assignments from t heir truth qualification forms the bases of a new reconstruction of the tru th tables. The results obtained from these extended truth tables are reduci ble to their Boolean equivalents under the axioms of Boolean theory. Wherea s, in fuzzy set and logic theory, we obtain a richer and more complex inter pretations of the "fuzzy middle" and "fuzzy contradiction."