Time, power, and democratic transitions

This study explores the impact of shifting power distributions among conten ding domestic groups on the dynamics of democratic transitions. A timing ga me is specified to demonstrate the vital influence exerted by relative powe r distributions on when an opposition is likely to mobilize and when an aut horitarian lender is willing to negotiate. The model suggests that democrat ic transitions occur under conditions of relative power parity between the authoritarian government and the political opposition. The hypothesized rel ationship is validated empirically on 17 Latin American countries in the pe riod from 1950 to 1990. The study also highlights the factors that affect t he peaceful or conflictual nature of a transition process, such as the degr ee to which domestic opposition groups are dissatisfied with an authoritari an status quo, the risk propensities of political leaders, and the anticipa ted costs of domestic or civil conflict. The theoretical and empirical resu lts of this study provide several significant insights and substantive impl ications for explaining as well as anticipating the timing of democratic tr ansitions.