Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games

Authors
Hofbauer, J Sorger, G
Citation
J. Hofbauer et G. Sorger, Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games, J ECON THEO, 85(1), 1999, pp. 1-23
Citations number
23
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN journal
00220531 → ACNP
Volume
85
Issue
1
Year of publication
1999
Pages
1 - 23
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-0531(199903)85:1<1:PFAESI>2.0.ZU;2-U
Abstract
The equilibrium selection approach of Matsui and Matsuyama (J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995), 415-434) which is based on rational players who maximize their discounted future payoff, is analyzed for symmetric two-player games with a potential function. It is shown that the maximizer of the potential functi on is the unique state that is absorbing and globally accessible for small discount rates. (C) 1999 Academic Press.