What is it for me to do something is the question discussed in the present
paper. It has been suggested that my doings are elicited by tryings, intent
ions, and other causal mechanisms. These theories do not offer any convinci
ng analysis of what it is for me to act. insight is sought by looking at so
me case studies involving temporary loss of the ability to move one's body.
What the case studies show, I conclude, is that when move my body in the n
ormal way, I do not first have to do something else that causes my body to
move. Normal actions are events bodily beings can generate spontaneously (d
irectly). An essential condition for having this kind of control is inside
(proprioceptive) awareness of the body. When inner awareness of the body is
Lost, control can Dc taken over by visual awareness. But then movement los
es its spontaneous character and depends on planning and intense concentrat
ion. One can think of the self ("I") from which my actions flow, as the men
tal life to which they belong, or as the consciousness that controls them.