BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH

Authors
ROSENMULLER J
Citation
J. Rosenmuller, BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH, Theory and decision, 42(2), 1997, pp. 105-146
Citations number
14
Categorie Soggetti
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods
Journal title
Theory and decision → ACNP
ISSN journal
00405833
Volume
42
Issue
2
Year of publication
1997
Pages
105 - 146
Database
ISI
SICI code
0040-5833(1997)42:2<105:BWII-A>2.0.ZU;2-Y
Abstract
Within this paper we consider a model of Nash bargaining with incomple te information. In particular, we focus on fee games, which are a natu ral generalization of side payment games in the context of incomplete information. For a specific class of fee games we provide two axiomati c approaches in order to establish the Expected Contract Value, which is a version of the Nash bargaining solution.