When registration barriers fall, who votes? An empirical test of a rational choice model

It is well known that those with higher SES characteristics tend to vote at higher rates in U.S. elections. Over the past several decades many propone nts of eased voter registration requirements have predicted that liberalizi ng voter registration laws will significantly improve turnout, especially a mong the least well-educated and the poor. In this article we offer a ratio nal choice model of turnout that leads us to expect the greatest turnout ga ins from virtually eliminating voter registration costs will instead accrue to those with medium income and education. We test this prediction longitu dinally over the period 1972-1992 using a vast survey and a natural experim ent comparing voters in states that adopted election day registration (EDR) with those residing in states maintaining more traditional closing dates. Contrary to much of the literature, citizens with medium education and medi um income voted more under EDR, as the model predicts. We conclude that the methods used here better capture and empirically identify the curvilinear relationship between voter registration laws and the turnout probabilities at various SES levels.