FEDERALISM AND THE EUROPEAN-UNION - A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Constitutional questions have resurfaced in the last few years with re gard to the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty is a kind of constit utional reform. The rejection of this treaty by Denmark in its first r eferendum, and the subsequent debate of the treaty that has taken plac e, raise questions about both the nature of the European Union, and th e process by which its rules (constitution) get revised and approved. Similar questions surround the entry of Austria and the three, additio nal Scandinavian countries into the Union. Perhaps, no event called th e European Union's constitution, or lack thereof, into question more t hat way in which a new President of the Commission was chosen during t he summer of 1994. This paper will reexamine the European Union's stru cture and procedures from a constitutional perspective. Drawing upon t he author's recently completed book, Constitutional Democracy, the pap er will review the purpose for the Union's existence, the implications of this purpose for the structure of the Union (federalism versus con federation), the rules for making collective decisions in the Union, c itizenship, and in particular, the procedures by which the European Un ion's ''Constitution'' is written and revised. The constitutional pers pective adopted is taken from public choice. The political institution s of the European Union are examined relative to those rational, self- interested individuals would choose to advance their interests.