The imposition of sanctions to achieve specific objectives has become
a frequent policy instrument used by the United Stares in its bilatera
l relations with China. These sanctions range from the deprival of-and
the attachment of conditions to-most-favored-nation (MFN) trading sta
tus for China and denials of technology transfers to the imposition of
import tariffs. They have been imposed in response to ''unacceptable'
' Chinese behavior over a variety of issues such as weapons proliferat
ion, infringements on intellectual property rights, and human rights v
iolations. The effectiveness of these sanctions depends on a number of
factors and will always remain a matter of degree. The paper suggests
that applying sanctions such as threatening revocation and/or applyin
g conditions to China's MFN status has failed to serve their declared
purposes. In the process, the United States has boxed itself in, as ca
rrying through such threats is a highly risky business, while reversin
g course both suggests impotence and reduces credibility.