REACTORS-RELATED UTILIZATION OPTIONS OF WEAPONS PLUTONIUM BEING RELEASED FROM THE DEFENSE PROGRAM

The release of considerable amounts of fissile materials has once agai n drawn the attention of politicians, scientists and the public to the nuclear problem, as has often been the case in the past when nuclear arms were being developed and tested. An essentially new factor which makes the current status of relations different from the former 'cold war years is the spirit of openness and collaboration between states i n response to this problem. It is known that Russia and the United Sta tes have differing viewpoints concerning the most dangerous material-p lutonium, though recently there has been a perceptible convergence of their respective positions. Russia from the very beginning has planned the separation of civil plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel and uti lization of the former in nuclear reactors for electricity production. In this case the handling of surplus weapons plutonium can be conside red as an additional episode in the nuclear power development strategy . In the United States, on the contrary, following the rejection of th e policy of separating and recycling civil plutonium, the surplus weap ons plutonium handling program is being considered, as a matter of fac t, separately from the national nuclear power program. That is why bur ial in geological formations has been considered for a long time as th e only principal method for disposal of surplus weapons plutonium. Nev ertheless, recently, to a considerable degree thanks to the position o f Russian scientists, the United States has had to recognize the exped ience of utilization of weapons plutonium as a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for light water reactors, in addition to the burial option. Presently in Russia various ways of surplus weapons plutonium utilization in fas t and in thermal reactors are being considered. From the practical poi nt of view, the most important question for each of the options is the amount of weapons plutonium utilized and the respective costs ratio. Preliminary analysis has shown that the extent of costs for weapons pl utonium utilization for any of the options depends upon employment of new or partially constructed installations. In cases where only existi ng or to be upgraded installations are used, the costs look real enoug h. Employment of new or partially constructed installations will incre ase the total cost on principle to a new level. This factor is especia lly important for reactor variants of plutonium management, which incl ude, as a minimum, two installations-the MOX fuel fabrication plant an d the nuclear reactor itself. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.