Forty-eight young children (2.5 and 3.0 years old) and 9 great apes (6
chimpanzees and 3 orangutans) participated in a hiding-finding game.
An adult human experimenter (the Hider) hid a reward in 1 of 3 opaque
containers aligned on a wooden plank. Another adult experimenter (the
Communicator) attempted to help the subject find the reward by giving
1 of 3 types of communicative sign: (1) Pointing, for which she placed
her hand directly above the correct container with index finger orien
ted down; (2) Marker, for which she placed a small wooden block on top
of the correct container; and (3) Replica, for which she held up a pe
rceptually identical duplicate of the correct container. At both ages,
children were above chance in this finding game with all 3 types of c
ommunicative sign, with Pointing being easiest (because they knew it p
rior to the experiment), Marker being next easiest, and Replica being
most difficult. In contrast, no ape was above chance for any of the co
mmunicative signs that it did not know before the experiment (some had
been trained in the use of the marker previously, and one knew pointi
ng), nor was group performance above chance for any of the signs, desp
ite the fact that apes experienced three times as many trials as child
ren on each sign. Our explanation of these results is that young child
ren understand the communicative intentions of other persons-although
they may have more difficulty comprehending the exact nature of those
intentions in some cases-whereas apes treat the behavioral signs of ot
hers as predictive cues only (signals). This may be because apes do no
t perceive and understand the communicative intentions of others, at l
east not in a human-like way.