EARNINGS PROFILE AND MONITORING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Authors
Citation
Ce. Bai, EARNINGS PROFILE AND MONITORING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, Economics letters, 57(2), 1997, pp. 219-225
Citations number
5
Journal title
ISSN journal
01651765
Volume
57
Issue
2
Year of publication
1997
Pages
219 - 225
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-1765(1997)57:2<219:EPAMUA>2.0.ZU;2-K
Abstract
This paper considers a two-period wage contract model in which the fir m has private information about productivity and chooses the intensity of monitoring the worker's effort. It shows that the optimal earnings job tenure profile is increasing. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.