EVENTS, EQUILIBRIA, AND GOVERNMENT SURVIVAL

Theory: A game-theoretic model of government formation yields an equil ibrium government, the robustness of which may be explored by subjecti ng it to exogenous shocks. This permits an examination of government d urability and survival in a cruel political world. Hypotheses: The vul nerability of a government to exogenous shocks depends upon the nature of the shock. A government may be quite resistant to some classes of shock, while it is highly vulnerable to others. Methods: Game-theoreti c analysis yields equilibrium results. A simulation technology is craf ted which allows us to subject this equilibrium to perturbations of it s underlying parameters (much in the spirit of wind-tunnel experiments in engineering). Results: The technology does indeed allow the system atic examination of well-defined cases. We find, for the case of two E uropean governments in the 1980s and 1990s, that they differ considera bly in their vulnerability to exogenous shocks.