SEPARATED POWERS, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT, AND TURNOUT IN US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Theory: Turnout is determined in part by the motivations of voters to affect the course of public policy. Institutional arrangements that co ndition the link between the vote and its policy consequences impact t hese motivations. One such institutional arrangement is the separation of powers. Countries with separated powers should see lower turnout, and anything that causes the extent of separation to vary should give rise to corresponding variations in turnout. Hypotheses: Divided gover nment, by temporarily increasing the extent to which powers are separa ted, will reduce the motivations of voters to participate in subsequen t elections. Methods: A time-serial model of turnout is developed and tested on data for U.S. presidential elections from 1840 to 1992. Find ings: Divided government does influence turnout, controlling for chang es in electoral laws and the closeness of elections. Moreover, the eff ects are cumulative, with turnout declining by about 2% for each conse cutive presidential election conducted under conditions of divided gov ernment. This finding may help to explain declining U.S. turnout in re cent years. More importantly, it validates the conjecture that the sep aration of powers itself has a depressing effect on turnout, which hel ps to explain why turnout is lower in the U.S. than elsewhere.