A SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL FOR A MIXED-STRATEGY GAME BETWEEN POLICE AND DRIVER

Game theorists have recommended many reasonable strategies in policy p roblems, using, in general, the concept of equilibrium strategy for an alyzing the dynamic consequences of available policy options. One of t he best known recommendations is that of George Tsebelis, which conten ds that increasing penalties is not a viable policy-tool for decreasin g the law-violation tendencies of drivers. This is because the interac tions between police and driver can best be represented as a mixed;str ategy in which the players choose their alternative actions based upon a probability, but the probability of driver's law violation cannot b e decreased by increasing the penalty. Our system dynamics model for a mixed-strategy game shows that it:takes a very long time for a game;t heoretic equilibrium to appear. Therefore, game players cannot, and sh ould not, depend on the equilibrium for choosing their actions. Furthe rmore, our mixed-game model shows that an increase in penalty can indu ce compliance from the people, contradictory to the game-theoretic sol ution, but consistent with real-world behaviors. (C) 1997 by John Wile y & Sons, Ltd.