The Supreme Court recently determined that the President of the United
States is not an ''agency'' within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act and that his actions are not subject to review under tha
t statute. The Court has, moreover, traditionally held that a federal
court may not entertain a suit seeking an injunction directed at the P
resident. The Court's cases raise the question of whether courts can p
rovide any relief for persons injured when the President acts unlawful
ly. Professor Siegel answers this question by considering a venerable,
but now little-known; method of judicial control over executive actio
n, called ''nonstatutory review.'' Courts used this form of suit to re
view executive branch behavior long before the APA existed. The nonsta
tutory review action avoids the sovereign immunity of the United State
s by making the fictional assumption that a suit against a government
officer, alleging unlawful official behavior, is not a suit against th
e government. Professor Siegel's examination of the history of nonstat
utory review reveals that the President, like other federal officials,
should be subject to suits concerning his official conduct. It demons
trates that the courts have traditionally taken a leading role in the
creation, of remedies against unlawful government action; courts need
not wait for Congress to create statutory remedies. Finally, the histo
ry of nonstatutory review provides an instructive look at the use of f
ictions as a method of legal development.