ISRAELI NATIONAL-SECURITY, 1973-96

Authors
Citation
E. Inbar, ISRAELI NATIONAL-SECURITY, 1973-96, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 555, 1998, pp. 62-81
Citations number
62
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
00027162
Volume
555
Year of publication
1998
Pages
62 - 81
Database
ISI
SICI code
0002-7162(1998)555:<62:IN1>2.0.ZU;2-A
Abstract
This article focuses on the main Israeli decision makers, reviews thei r perceptions of the changing strategic environment, and analyzes the dilemmas and policies with respect to Israel's main national security components. A review of the period shows much continuity: (1) the patt ern of decision making remained highly centralized; (2) many of the Is raeli leaders were socialized in the defense establishment; (3) Yitzha k Rabin was the towering figure for most of the period; (4) the main e lements of Israeli strategic thinking (deterrence, early warning, deci sive victory, and self-reliance) remained constant; (5) Israel did not succumb to the temptation to adopt an open nuclear strategy; (6) the Israeli level of threat perception became lower primarily because of t he emergence of a more benign international environment. We see in the 1990s a slight departure from past premises and policies, although al l in all, it can be said that Israel has not fundamentally changed its security doctrine during the period reviewed here.