Research in comparative and international politics often deals with th
e same questions, such as the nature of war, the conduct of foreign ec
onomic policy, and the consequences of different political institution
s. Yet there is a pronounced gap between these two subfields of politi
cal science. In neorealist theory, this gap is to be expected, since t
he structure of the international system cannot be reduced to facts ab
out its component units. Given the incompleteness of international rel
ations theory, it rarely provides knowledge that is sufficient to expl
ain the actions of the component units. This theoretical insufficiency
provides the motivation to bring theories of domestic and internation
al politics closer together. Three attempts to integrate comparative a
nd international politics are discussed in this article. The first der
ives from the logic of two-level games as originally advanced by Rober
t Putnam. The second relies on a special application of second-image r
eversed theory by Ronald Rogowski in Commerce and Coalitions. The thir
d examines the merging of previously distinctive systems of rules and
laws among countries in the European Union. This approach does not rel
y on a single exemplar (as do the first two) but uses a number of inst
itutional and legal theories to conceptualize the domestification of a
regional, international political system. Thus, strategic interaction
, the domestic effects of international trade flows, and institutional
merging of legal systems provide three quite different metaphors for
narrowing the gap between our knowledge of domestic and of internation
al politics.